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WHAT IF THE BUTCHERS IN THE SLAUGHTER-
HOUSE CASES HAD WON?: AN EXERCISE IN
"COUNTERFACTUAL" DOCTRINE
Jane L Scarborough'
Te spirit of ierty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is right.'
In thinking about my contribution to this conference with the rather
daunting task of exploring "Law, Feminism & the 21st Century," I found
myself reflecting upon the state of the law, or more particularly,
constitutional law. As we prepare to end one century and begin another,
how well has the United States Constitution--America's unique
contribution to jurisprudence-and the legal doctrine which has evolved
in "expounding" that extraordinary document, served 'the issues about
which women care the most, namely, human rights?
This is more than a rhetorical question for me. As the person
responsible for teaching constitutional law to half of my law school's
first-year students, I am faced with the increasingly impossible task of
both imparting and interpreting the growing body 9f constitutional
literature-mostly in the traditional form of Supreme Court opinions.2
I respond to that challenge by, on the one hand, leading my students
on a 'forced march" through the standard "oldies but goodies" found in
virtually every casebook and bar review outline in the country and, on
the other, affirming their justifiable frustration, bewilderment, and
ultimate anger at the doctrinal contortions and hair-splitting that too
often masquerade as principled judicial interpretations of the Constitu-
tion. As one woman in my class recently entreated, 'Please tell me that
the study of constitutional law is not going to contribute to my growing
cynicism." Sadly, my response satisfied neither of us. But my students
and I clearly are not the only ones troubled by the current state of
constitutional doctrine as itis presented in casebooks and studied in law
school classrooms.
* Associate Professor of Law, Northeasten Unihersity School of Law. BA., Rice
University, 1964; M.A, Purdue University, 1967; Ph.D., Rice University 1972; J.D., Northeaste
University School of Law, 1985. This paper was presented at the Law, Fembim & the 21st
Century Conference on April 4,1998, in Portland, Maine.
1. Learned Hand, The SpLit ofLibery, in TH SMuToFLmtRYv PAPERS &ADDRES S
oFIEARNED HAND 190 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1974).
2. For the past severalyears, I have used one of the most popular casebooks in the field,
Seidman, Sunstein & Tsnet's Consmtional Law (3d ed. 1996), %"rich isjust shy of 2000 pa-es
in length. DenickBell has recently depare fromtraditional casebook fonmats ith the publication
of his two-volume book, Constxutional Conflicts (1997). Incredibly, the primary text is less than
500 pages, with a second volume made up entirely of edited, relevant cases cross-refrencd to in
volume one. The author acknowledges that his methodology (widch depends heavily on class
discussions of hypotheticals as an introduction to the major constitutional themes) may not be
suitable for large sections of first-year students.
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In a recent HarvardLaw Review commentary, two well-known consti-
tutional scholars called into question not only what Supreme Court cases
are "canonized" in casebooks, but whether the "Court-centeredness" of
our scholarship and teaching about constitutional law has led to an
impoverishment of the discourse on justice. The authors document how
"[c]ases become important to teach and remember because they serve as
the icons (and demons) of an invented constitutional tradition"3-a
tradition that "comes into being at a particular point in history, and then
regards itself as always having been there."4
There is no better example of such an icon illustrating the canoniza-
tion of "invented tradition" than the Slaughter-House Cases.' More
important, they represent the way in which, once accepted into legal
orthodoxy, such icons can provide the foundation for a reduction in
rights originally thought to be inherent in our most sacred historical and
legal texts.6 Finally, the Slaughter-House Cases offer a point of
departure for conceptualizing an alternative doctrinal framework with
which to revise and expand the existing canons of constitutional law.
Such a revision would at once be more faithful to the historical intent
and inchoate promise of the Fourteenth Amendment and a more
principled source for grounding fundamental human rights than existent
equal protection and substantive due process doctrine.'
One approach to challenging the legacy of the Slaughter-House Cases
is to borrow from a new methodology, much in vogue among historians,
called "counterfactual history."' The use of this notion of alternative
events is based on the premise that the understanding of history can be
greatly enhanced by changing one significant fact and examining other
3. J.M. Balkin &Sanford Levinson, The CanonsofConstitutionalLaw, 111 HARV.LREV.
963, 1019 (1998) (emphasis added). Balkin and Levinson compare the canonization of legal texts
with that in the liberal arts and conclude that the judicial doctrine of stare decisis and the Supreme
Court-centeredness of law school pedagogy give legal scholars less influence in the choice and
institutionalization of constitutional canons than scholars in other disciplines. See id. at 1008-19.
For a brief etymology and explanation of the word "canon" as used by the authors, see id at 1024
n.24.
4. Id at 1008.
5. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
6. The Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, and the 14th Amendment, in
particular, represent the "scriptures" of human rights fashioned out of the peculiarly American
experience and translation of 18th Century Enlightenment ideals. As I suggest later, other nations
have benefitted from those texts without the accompanying reductive, negative aspects of our own
doctrinal developments. See infra text accompanying notes 13-18.
7. The need to revisit the Slaughter-House Cases and their impact on the Privileges or
Immunities Clause is argued most forcefully in Charles L Black's latest book, A New Birth of
Freedom: Human Rights, Named & Unnamed (1997). Balkin and Levinson also identify the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment as one of several candidates ripe for.
resurrection to expand current orthodoxywith respect to significant parts of the Constitution that
have been ignored or eviscerated. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 3, at 1020.
8. See William IL Honan, Historians Warming to Games of "What If, " N.Y. TIME, Jan.
7, 1998, at B7.
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outcomes? It is thus a way of "undoing the determinism that haunts our
every conception of history"' that can then lead us to question long-held
assumptions by eliminating "hindsight bias."'  You might well ask, why
look backward as a way of thinking about future doctrinal developments
in constitutional law? As someone who was trained in constitutional
history long before I became a lawyer and, subsequently, a law school
teacher, I am keenly aware that history informs our future choices as
much as it reflects those made in the past. "Virtual history"-as this
new methodology is sometimes called-allows the practitioner to
transport herself or himself into a contemporaneous context of a chosen
event and imagine a different outcome, another "reality.:'"
The counterfactual doctrinal framework I propose is based on three
premises: first, that the Fourteenth Amendment was this country's true
"Never Again" formulation of basic human rights; second, that begin-
ning with the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court took what was
intended to be an affirmation of substantive, positive rights protected by
national citizenship and interpreted it in such a way as to result in a
crabbed, negative doctrine that pitted the rights of some individuals and
groups against others; and, third, that there is no principled doctrinal
approach today to equal protection jurisprudence (or its more suspect
"poor relation," substantive due process)-a fact that has been particu-
larly devastating to women and minorities who are most vulnerable to
legislative enactments which disproportionally burden them.
9. Having only recently discovered "counterfactual" or "virtual" history, I suddenly seem
toencounteritevrywhert. I eamwolkuptheothermoring to a report on National Public Rdio
talking about counterftcml sports history-1M if Knut Rockee hadn't gone to Notre Dame-s
there would never have been "The Gipper" to win one for, and Ronald Reagan's carcer might neer
have taken off.
10. Sven Birkets, In Camp With History, Gore odal's Navd Raises the Question: What
Happens Vhen the Past isAltered?, BOSTON GtnEE, Mar. 8,1998, at El (rfening to Gore Vidal's
use ofthis genre in his new novel, The Smithsonian Institution).
11. Balkin and Levinson suggest the benefit of an analogous methodology--te use of
"counter-canon," or different sets of cases and materials than those typically found in casebooks,
"to critique existing normative theories of constitutional law." Balkin & Levinson, supra note 3.
at 1020.
12. Counterfhatial histryis tbe flipide of ,wat Reva Siegel empo)s when she invites her
readers "to assume an imaginary standpoint in the middle of the tvety.first century" from which
to view retrospectively "the evolution of our current constitutional ramework." Reva Siegel. hy
Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforing State Action, 49
STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1130 (1997). Siegel suggests that such a viewpoint might wall reveal a
dynamic atwo kwhich she calls "preservation-through-transformation" where doctrinal structur
and justifactory rhetoric evolve ai an old regime is contested resulting in continued "inequalities
among status-diff-erentiated groups" even while the past is discredited. See it. at 1119-30. I
certainly share Siegel's view that "retrospective judgment" can result in a certain h)pocrisy and
myopia with respect to entrenched systems of subordination in ourown times and that the meaning
of equal protection can and has changed over time. As I suggest in this presentation, however. I
believe "equal protection" was never intended to carry the doctrinal weight imposed on it after the
"privileges or immunities" clause was eviscerated in the Slaughter-House Cases.
19981
MAINE LAW REVIEW
THE "NEVER AGAIN" PRINCIPLE
In a lecture given this winter at my law school, a member of South
Africa's Constitutional Court (equivalent to our Supreme Court) and one
of the new South African "founding fathers," Justice Albie Sachs,
emphasized the importance of context and history in understanding the
structural nature of any system of law governed by a written constitu-
tion.'3 One could only understand the nature of equality as guaranteed
under the South African Constitution, he explained, within the context
of South Africa's history of apartheid. Within that context, equality
meant "inclusion" for South Africans. Thus, establishing substantive
equality, not just formal equality, became a conscious goal of the
framers of the South African charter. It was, Justice Sachs said, the
"Never Again" principle of their bill of rights. That concept of non-
discrimination became the first right enumerated in the South African
Constitution--their equivalent of "equal protection." But, as he pointed
out, it has some important differences from equal protection doctrine as
it has developed under our own Constitution. The equality provision
prohibits discrimination without regard to whether it is direct or indirect,
private or public.'4 When Justice Sachs offered an example of what a
comparable "Never Again" principle might have been in our own Bill
of Rights, he pointed to the Third Amendment's prohibition against
quartering troops during peacetime in civilian homes.'
In a sense, one might consider the entire Bill of Rights as having
collectively represented a "Never Again" principle of state sovereignty
after the colonial experience under English rule. But five years of the
bloodiest civil war in the history of the world, prior to this century,
forever changed that interpretation. As one of the leading jurists at the
time wrote, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments,
taken together, have "radically changed the original theory of govern-
ment" by emphasizing the rights of "life and liberty," rather than
13. While many of the emerging nations of the 20th Century have looked to the United
States Constitution as a model, constitutional scholars in this country have, with few exceptions.
shown little interest in drawing on the experience of some of these more rcent "experiments" in
government under a written constitution. Recent interdisciplinary approaches to the law,.such as
critical race and feminist theories, queer law, and postmodernist theories, along with a more
international law student population, have had the salutary effect of changing our "smug self-
assurance" and led to "an increasing curiosity about how things might be done" differently. Balkln
& Levinson, supra note 3, at 968-69.
14. See Justice Albie Sachs, Remarks at The Valerie Gordon Human Rights Lecture (Jan.
15, 1998) (given at the Northeastern University School of Law). Justice Sachs, appointed by
President Nelson Mandela, was a human rights lawyer and freedom fighter in the anti-apartheid
struggle and played a leading role in negotiating that country's democratic transition after
Mandela's release from prison in 1990.
15. "No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the
Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." U.S. CONST. amend. 13L
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property. 6 No longer----"Never Again"-would it be necessary, he said,
for the words "people," "persons," and "citizens" to be "twisted and tor-
tured... for contemporaneous history leaves no doubt of what was in-
tended" under the Civil War Amendments. 7 What was intended was to
correct "the great flaw in the Antebellum constitutional scheme," speci-
fically, the lack of congressional authority to enforce the Bill of Rights
(and thus the newly enacted Civil Rights Act of 1866) against the
states.' s
THE SLAUGHTE_-HousE CASES: "BREAD INTO A STONE"
The immediate issue that precipitated the Slaughter-House Cases was
a number of constitutional challenges to a twenty-five-year charter gran-
ted by the Louisiana Legislature establishing a monopoly on the slaugh-
tering of animals in three parishes along a ten-mile stretch of the
Mississippi-including the entire port of New Orleans. 9 Various groups
16. George W. Paschal, REMARKS AT THE AMERICAN UNION ACADEMY OF LnERATURt,
SCIENCE, AND ARTr (Mar. 7, 1870) (pamphlet found in the Paschal biographical collection in the
Austin, Texas Public library). A Texas unionist during the Civil War, Pascba successfully argued
the landmark case of Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868). before the Supreme Court in
which ChiefJustice Salmon Chase declared secession a nullity. Paschal was later instrumental in
the founding of Georgetown University Law School See Jane L Scarborough, Ceorge W. Paschal
Texas Unionist and Scalawag Jurisprudent (1972) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rice
University); see generally HAROLD M. HYMAN, THE RECONsTRUCION JusI'CE OF SALmON P.
CHASE: DiRE TRmN & TEXAS V. WtrEm(1997).
17. Paschal, supra note 16.
18. Earl M. Malt , The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise-Section One in
the Joint Committee on Reconstuction, 45 OMCo Sr. I. 933 (1984) (arguing ta the historical and
legal background of the "privileges or immunities" clause at the time of the 14th Amedmet's
passage "provides evidence that the language encompasses not only the entire Bill of Rights, but
other rights as wal," but concluding that a review of the proceedings of the Report of the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction "evinced no clear consensus on the meaning of the language of
section one, particularly the privileges and [sic] immuniies clanse"). John Bingham was one of the
few Republicans who had opposed passage of the Civil Rights Bill because of the L of
congressional authority to enforce tfe Bill of Rights against thestates. Bingham's language, which
was ultimately adopted as Section One, was "designed to remedy that flaw.7 Id. at 951.
19. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 WAL) 36,59-60 (1873). The Louisiana
statute in question was entitled, "An act to protect the health of the city of New Orleans. to locate
stock landings and slaughter houses, and to incorporate the T ct City Live Stock Landing &
SlaughterHouse Company." rd. at 38. The act provided that. after June 1, 1869, it was unlawful
for anyone other than the CC.LS.L & SIL Co. to land, keep, or slaughter cattle, sheep, swine, or
other animals or to maintain any stock landing, yards, pens. slaughterhouses, orabattoirs, at any
point on either side of a 10-mile stretch of the Mississippi River, including the entire city of New
Orleans. See id. at 38-39. Despite being framed in terms of a health regulation, the immediate
impetus for the slaughterhouse monopoly undoubtedly came from a desire to make New Orlas.
rather than Chicago, "the very heart of the world-slaughtering industry." Mitchell Franklin, The
Founda os and Meaning ofthe Slghterouse Case (pt. 1). 18 TuL L REV. 1.4 (1943). With
an estimated surplus of 5,OO0000 cattle in Texas at the end of the Civil War, see i/. at I & nl, and
with the completion in 1869 of the fir transcontinental railroad far north of this vast supply of
meat, see i. at 4, such a vision was highly compatible with that held by die-hard advocates of a
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of the more than one thousand butchers, Who were effectively put out of
business, challenged the monopoly as a violation of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 and of their "privileges or immunities" under Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment. After the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld
the monopoly, the case was appealed on writ of error to the Supreme
Court.
As the full Court's first opportunity to address the meaning of the
recently enacted Fourteenth Amendment, it seems unlikely that the
importance of this decision was lost on any of the participants. Indeed,
there is even some suggestion that the Court's desire to seize the moment
led it to deny a motion to dismiss the petition despite the fact that a
settlement had been reached between the original parties to the suit prior
to reargument before the Court.2 ' Writing for the majority, Justice
southern route for a second transcontinental railroad. The QC..LS.L. & S.H. Co. "was conceived
of as a customhouse through which this Texas beef must go in order to reach the American market."
Id Opponents of the monopoly at the time estimated its value to New Orleans alone could'be worth
as much as $45,000,000 over the 25-year life of the legislative grant. See id at 10. The
slaughterhouse charter was also part of a larger public discussion of monopolies and their economic
functions as the South attempted to adjust to post-Civil War economic dislocations and
opportunities. In this way, the slaughterhouse monopoly bridged the earlier debate around Fulton's
steamship monopoly (which also loomed large in establishing New Orleans and-the Mississippi
River's place in the then emerging transportation revolution) and the growth of monopolies
generally in the late 19th Century. See id at 36-39.
20. Although traditional accounts of the Slaughter-House Cases describe it as a legal battle
by "white" butchers attempting to use the newly minted 14th Amendment to protect their rights
rather than those of the freedmen, there were in fact elements of ethnic and class (if not mcial)
overtones to the controversy. The butchers who were challenging the legislative monopoly granted
to the C.C.LS.L & S.L. Co. were known locally as "Gascons" These natives or descendants of
natives from Gascony, a province in southwestern France, traditionally had been the local purveyors
of butchered meat in New Orleans, many of them having learned the trade in the French abattoirs.
Local newspapers at the time were filled with evidence of xenophobic comments directed at the
Gascons, including remarks made by one of the seventeen incorporators of the new monopoly who
referred to the butchers who opposed them as "French carpetbaggers,"--the ultimate epithet in the
South during Reconstruction. The New Orleans Tines, owned by Charles A. Weed (who had much
the better claim to the hated term, having come to New Orleans from Connecticut during the
military occupation of the city under Union General Benjamin Butler), was the major mouthpiece
for the monopoly and noted for its anti-Gasconism. See Franklin, supra note 19, at 22, 34.
21. There is also evidence that John A. Campbell (representing the butchers) may have had
ulterior motives in the formulation of his arguments. Appointed to the Supreme Court in 1853 by
Democrat Franklin Pierce, Campbell resigned after his native state seceded, served in the
Confederate subcabinet during the war, and was one of the Confederate Commissioners who met'
with Lincoln at the Hampton Roads Conference in 1865 to discuss the conditions of surrender. See
HENRY G. CONNOR, JOHN ARCHBALD CAMPBELL: ASSOCIATE JUSTIcE OP THE UNITED STATES
SuPRmE CoURT (Da Ca po Press 1971) (1920). To Campbell, a devoted admirer of Calhoun,
would fall the ironic (some would'say demonic) role of appearing 15 years.later before his former
colleagues as counsel for the butchers in Slaughter-House. In his eshaustive and little-known, two-
part article on the Slaughter-House Cases, Mitchell Franklin accused Campbell of"tak[ing] upon
himself the task of overcoming the results of the Civil War by veering the Fourteenth Amendment
about, so that it became the instument of the defeated South and not a weapon against the defeated
South, as it had been intended to be." Mitchell Franklin, The Foundations and Meaning of the
Slaughterhouse Cases (pt. 2), 18 TUL L REV. 218, 237 (1943). In a similar vein (if somewhat
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Miller made it clear that if
there is a difference between the privileges and immunities belonging
to a citizen of the United States as such, and those belonging to the
citizen of the State as such, the latter must rest for their security and
protection where they have heretofore rested for they are not
embraced by this paragraph of the amendment
The effect of Miller's opinion was to read out any substantive meaning
to national citizenship and to reassert the antebellum locus of individual
rights in the hands of the states.
Although there were three separate dissenting opinions z Justice
Joseph Bradley's dissent is particularly instructive with regard to his
view of the potential scope of the Fourteenth AmendmenL Bradley was
no stranger to the long trail of litigation which ultimately led to the
Supreme Court's landmark decision. As a newly appointed associate
justice riding the Fifth Circuit, Bradley heard arguments as early as June
1870 on behalf of the anti-monopoly butchers in New Orleans who were
seeking injunctive relief. The question before the Court, as Bradley
explained it, was "whether the fourteenth amendment to the constitution
is intended to secure to the citizens of the United States of all classes
merely equal rights; or whether it is intended to secure to them any
absolute rights." In granting the temporary injunction until the
Supreme Court issued its decision, Bradley concluded "that the
fourteenth amendment of the constitution was intended to protect the
citizens of the United States in some fundamental privileges and
immunities of an absolute and not merely of a relative character."'
Identifying the privileges guaranteed by the new amendment with "the
very foundations of republican government,"6 Bradley gave the
Fourteenth Amendment the broadest possible meaning.
The new prohibition that "no state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States" is not identical with the clause in the [original]
constitution .... It embraces much more.... The "privileges and
differing tone). Charles Fahirman's scholarly heatroent of Slaughter-House in his volume on the
History of zhe Supreme Court of the United States suggests Campbel's mz- in alig that case th
Court's first opportunity to interpret the new Amendment was cr'ucial CARLEs FAfM AN. THE
HIIRYOFTHSUPREMECOURTOFHEUNMmrSTATES RECOmUCIO,-4AN R EU,., 1864-
88, at 1319 (1971). A farmilia saying at the time the Supreme Court decided the Slaughter-House
Cases was: "Leave it to God and Mr. CampbelL" Id.
22. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 WaIL) at75.
23. ChiefJustice Salmon P. Chase dissented vithout opinion. See id. at 11. Suffering from
a recent stroke. Chase died a few weeks after the Slaughter.House Cases were dec-d. See
HYMAN, supra note 16, at 164-65.
24. Live-Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Lending &
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649. 650 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8. 408).
25. Id. at 653.
26. Id at 652.
1998]
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immunities" secured by the original constitution, were only such as
each state gave to its own citizens.... But the fourteenth amendment
prohibits any state from abridging the privileges or immunities of the
citizens of the United States, whether its own citizens or any others.
It not merely requires equality of privileges; but it demands that the
privileges and immunities of all citizens shall be absolutely un-
abridged, unimpaired. 7
While Bradley did not attempt to list all of these privileges or immuni-
ties, he concluded that these "fundamental privileges" were not intended
"only to secure to all citizens equal capacities before the law. That was
at first our view of it. But it does not so read." The difference between
"capacities" and."rights" to Justice Bradley was the difference between
procedure and substance.
Bradley's views two years later, as expressed in his dissent from the
majority opinion in Slaughter-House, had not changed. If anything, his
understanding of the revolution wrought by the Radical Republicans of
the 39th Congress was clearer. Echoing the expansive view in his circuit
court opinion, Bradley equated the fundamental rights of a free citizen
with the "privileges or immunities" clause and not simply a guarantee of
mere "equality of privileges" with other citizens.29 Where could one
find "an authoritative declaration of some of the most important
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States?" 3 Bradley
answered that it could be found in the Constitution itself and in the Bill
of Rights.
The resulting five-to-four decision effectively gutted the "privileges
or immunities" clause which from the standpoint of the Amendment's
drafters was the key to insuring the protection of fundamental rights
through the primacy of national citizenship.32 In addition, the Court
narrowed the availability of the newly-created remedies to the freedmen
only, despite legislative intent to the contrary.33 Within a matter of
27. Id
28. ld at 654.
29. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 118 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
30. Id
31. See id
32. At least one legal scholar has suggested that if Justice Field would have "supplemented
his opinion with a correct analysis of the Nimth Amendment," he might have been able to garner a
majority. Michael Conant, Animonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments:
Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785, 790 (1982).
33. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US. (16 Wall.) at 81. As a number of constitutional
historians and scholars have pointed out, John Bingham specifically intended the language of
Section 1 of the 14th Amendment (which e wrote) to remedy "the great flaw" in the passage of the
Civil Rights Bill, namely that Congress lacked the authority to enforce the Bill of Rights against the
states. See. e.g., Maltz, supra note 18, at 951. Additionally, the fact that the Joint Committee had
rejected the language of the so-called "Owen Plan," which specifically refered to the civil rights
of Blacks, would seem to offer conclusive proof that the narrow interpretation given to the 14th
[Vol. 50:211
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years, however, the Court would see the possibilities of broadening these
remedies as a sword to strike down progressive state legislation on
behalf of private economic rights of the very type denied the unfortunate
butchers. All of these results were obvious at the time as evidenced by
Justice Noah Swayne's words in his dissent
The construction adopted by the majority of my brethren is, in my
judgment, much too narrow. It defeats, by a limitation not antici-
pated, the intent of those by whom the [Fourteenth Amendment] was
framed and of those by whom it was adopted. To the extent of that
lnitation it turns, as it were, what was meant for bread into a stone.
... I earnestly hope that the consequences to follow may prove less
serious and far-reaching than the minority fear they will be.'
Unfortunately, the fears of the dissenting justices proved well-founded.
THM TrIM Is IGHT
The Supreme Court's decision in the Slaughter-House Cases is a
perfect example of what Howard Jay Graham called "law office
history"--that is, history written (and in this case rewritten) by judicial
interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions and by the legal
profession's dependence on the concept of stare decisis. Although all
history is written from a point of view, lawyers are particularly suscepti-
ble to a result-oriented version of the facts?6 This distortion is magni-
fied by the Supreme Court's premier role in interpreting the Constitu-
tion, with the resulting "big cases" dominating the legal "canons" we
come to take for granted and which pervade our doctrinal and pedagogi-
cal "habits of thoughts."7
Amendment by Justice Miller in Slaughter-House was, at the very least, unfaithful to kgslati%-
intent with respect to the reach of the protections. See iL at 948-70.
34. TheSlaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. (16 WAIL) at 129 (Sa)y, J. dieting) (eniphasis
35. Graham wrote "that law review constitutional history seldom has been institutional
history-, the political juices, and even chronology, generally are lost in extracting the rules. More
and more, what we get is the story of a f&w major case. then ultimately merely a truncated analysis
of the prevailing appellate opinions." HOWARD JAYGnAHAM EVERYMAN's CoN srtmmoN 247
(1968); see also Alfred H. Kelley, Clio and the Court. An Illicit Lore Affair. 1965 SUP. Cr. REV.
119,119-32(1965).
36. Kelly further defined "law-office history" as the "selection of data favomrable: to the
position being advanced without regard to or concern for contradictory data or proper evaluation
of the relevance ofthe data proffered." Kelly, supra note 35, at 122 n.13; see also J,ck N. Rakove,
The Origins ofVudidal Review: A Pleafor New Contexts, 49 STAN. L REV. 1031 (1997) (calling
for a form of 'Critical History," somewhat akin to Critical Legal Studies and Critical Face Theory.
that would include new voices and stories across disciplines to enrich the contest of our
understanding of constitutional law and history). Since "most of our reasoning about the present
is in fact deeply historical in nat-re." Rakove points out that "historians have an imporant critical
function to play in preventing sloppy appeals to the authority of the past" Id. at 1032-33.
37. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 3, at 1002-03.
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[S]ome cases and materials may languish in relative obscurity for
decades or even centuries ... and then become central to the
pedagogical, theoretical, or cultural literacy canons.... Cases and
opinions become timeless ... when the time is right.'
The decision in the Slaughter-House Cases has been characterized
recently by one of the legendary constitutional commentators of this
century as "probably the worst holding, in its effects on human rights,
ever uttered by the Supreme Court." 9 Yet, every first-year law student
learns in constitutional law that the "privileges or immunities" clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the rights of national
citizenship,' rendering the clause meaningless as a source of federal
protection against state infringement of unenumerated rights or of
individual rights of the type originally guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.4
The practical effect of the Slaughter-House doctrine was to reassert the
primacy of state citizenship-at least within the domestic boundaries of
the United States-over that of federal citizenship. The political effect
was to mark the end of so-called Radical Reconstruction as surely as the
Hayes-Tilden disputed presidential election in the same year marked the
end of military occupation of the defeated southern states. Finally, the
legal effect of Slaughter-House was to focus the Court's attention on
interpreting what remained of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees-
namely, the "due process" and "equal protection" clauses as applied to
the states, and the enforcement powers granted to Congress to pass
"appropriate legislation" to enforce those protections.
It is beyond the scope of this conceptual presentation to persuade you
that such a rendering of the Fourteenth Amendment was wholly
inconsistent with the historical, legislative, and political events that
preceded it. Suffice to say that, as has been observed by more than one
38. Id at 1010.
39. BLACK, supra note 7, at55.
40. These rights include the right to travel to the seat of government and the right to safety
on the high seas. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,79 (1873).
41. Jerry Goldman's list of "truly canonical cases," based on his comparative study using
11 major constitutional casebooks, included only 10 cases found in all of the casebooks. In
addition, there were eight more "candidates" found in all but one of the samples--the Slaughter-
House Cases was among those eight. See Jerry Goldman, Is There a Canon of Constitutional Law?,
AM POL SCL ASS'N. NEwsV (Lawand Courts See. of the Am. Pol Sci. Ass'n), Spring 1993, at 2-4,
cited in Balldn & Levinson, supra note 3, at 974 n.43. I agree that any list of "truly canonical
cases" should include the Slaughter-House Cases, but like others before me, I am arguing for a
fresh look at other materials and voices, beyond Justice Samuel Miller's majority opinion and the
subsequent doctrinal implications that flowed from that decision, in the hope of finding a more
principled path to constitutional protection of fundamental rights through the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment.
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historian, what the South lost on the battlefield was to a large extent
regained in the courts-albeit in new forms.
Despite his later defection in the Civil Rights Cases, Bradley's
original interpretation of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
remained intact and can be traced through a line of Supreme Court
dissents beginning with his own in Slaughter-House. The first Justice
John Marshall Harlan took up the mantle-ironically in his dissent from
Bradley's majority opinion--in the Civil Rights Cases,"3 later that same
term in Hurtado v. Calfornia, and subsequently in Twining v. New
Jersey!5 After twenty years, Harlan began to have an impact as evi-
denced by Justice William Moody who, writing for the majority in
Twining, showed "clear signs of misgivings about the path of decision
in fourteenth amendment cases," but who "concluded, rather lamely, 'the
question is no longer open in this courL"'
Although Slaughter-House, along with the Civil Rights Cases, has
been repeatedly cited as embracing the correct meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment, a close examination of the four separate opinions in
Slaughter-House reveals a conspicuous lack of concern for the recent
legislative history, probably because that history was well-known (and
understood) by all the participants. In fact, it was not until 1947, when
Justice Hugo Black, in Adamson v. California, ' 7 launched his own
substantial attack on what had become the traditional interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, that the most exhaustive historical research
began on the legislative history---research that was later used to buttress
the Court's unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of Education' If
one accepts the notion that substantive due process had its origins in the
Dred Scott decision (as Cass Sunstein does), then the post-Slaughter-
House Court picked up where Chief Justice Taney left off.49
42. See Conan1,supra note 32; seegenera//yHAROLDM. HybAAMORE PEPcrU0oN:
TlE IPAcr OFTrm CIMWARANDRECOSMUCUONONTHECOS mm .o (1973); HAROLDM.,
HYMAN &WMLnM M. WMci, EQUALJUsncE UNDERTHE LAW (1982).
43. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
44. 110 U.S. 516(1884).
45. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
46. This view apparently was shared by Oliver Wendell Holmes in a later decision. See
Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586,595 (1930) (Holmes J, dissenting) (staing that by 1903 it -as
"too late to observe the original meaning of the amendment); see also LOREN P. BETH. THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMEICAN CONSrmON. 1877-1917. at 207-08 (1971) (noting Justice
Moody's dismissal of the "old privileges orimmunities argument" in T7wining v. NewJersey).
47. 332U.S.46 (1947).
48. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
49. See Cass R. Sunsten, The Dred Scott Case:WahNoesonAffirmativeAction the Right
to Die & Same-Sex Marriage, I GREEN BAG 2d 39. 44 (1997) (concluding that Chief Justice
Taney's decision in the Dred Scott case "was the birthplace of the idea of 'subsnti% due process,'
theidea used in theLochnerera cas e in Roe v. Wade, and in many of the most controversial dcci-
sions in the Court's history"). The Court's interpretation of the 14th Amendment in the Slaughter-
House Cases is a perfect example of Siegel's concept of "preservation-through-transformaion"-
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There have been periodic attempts to resurrect' the "privileges or
immunities" clause over the years. 5 One recent example can be found
in the Colorado Supreme Court's decision striking down that state's
controversial "Amendment 2."' Justice Scott wrote a concurring
opinion arguing that the anti-gay amendment was unconstitutional under
the "privileges or immunities" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
stating that: "Citizenship, not the good graces of the electorate, is the
currency of our republican form of government."52  Although the
Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the judgment of the Colorado
Supreme Court, the majority expressly disavowed relying on the equal
protection analysis of the state courto And although the Court made no
reference to Justice Scott's "privileges or immunities" analysis, although
Justice Kennedy did begin his opinion for the majority by borrowing
Scott's use of Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy (that the Constitution
"neither knows nor tolerates classes among its citizens"). 4
CONCLUSION
I have used the Slaughter-House Cases as the fulcrum of this exercise
in counterfactual doctrine because I believe that the Fourteenth
Amendment codified this country's true "Never Again" principles and,
unlike Justice Holmes, I do not believe that it is "too late to observe the
original meaning of the amendment, '55 which was understood at the time
to "nationalize a constitutional limitation on state action" which singled
out any person or group of persons for special benefits or burdens
that is, preservation of the original understanding of federalism as though the Civil War had never
happened and Calhoun had won. See also Siegel, supra note 12.
50. The most thorough recent scholarly effort was John Hanison's meticulous review of the
legislative history, as well as the comrmentary, in Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, 101 YALE LJ. 1385 (1992). See also Normand G. Benoit, The Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: Can There Be Life After Death?, 11 S FOLK U. L REV. 61
(1976); Conant, supra note 32, at 785; Philip B. Kurland, The Privileges or Imnunities Clause: "Its
Hour Come Round at Last"?, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 405 (1972). The fact that Charles Black chose
to make this theme the subject of what he describes in the preface as a "short book to state and to
support, in my own voice, my own life's conclusions" is powerful testimony to the possibilities such
a resunection still holds. BLAC, supra note 7, at ix.
51. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (CoL 1994) (en banc).
52. Id. at 1351 (Scott, J., concurring).
53. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct. 1620,1624 (1996).
54. Ld. at 1623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)); see also Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d at 1351 (Scott, J., concurring) (quoting Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 559 (Hadan, J., dissenting)).
55. The most recent Amendment to the Constitution is the 27th Amendment which was
ratified in 1992 even though the Amendment was one of the original 12 amendments proposed in
1789 (including those which subsequently became known as the Bill of Rights). State legislatures
resurrected and began to approve the Amendment in 1978, and the requisite number of states (38)
eventually ratified it into law. The controversial Amendment is discussed in William Van Alstyne.,
What Do You ThinkAbout the Twenty-Seventh Amendment?, 10 CONsT. COMMENTARY 9 (1993).
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without an ateqate "public purpose." The Fourteenth Amendment's
"privileges or immunities" clause was intended to ground substantive
rights in each individual's national citizenship. Had one vote been
different in the Slaughter-House Cases, the counterfactual doctrinal
development in the twentieth century might have been very differentO
Instead of going down the road of economic substantive due process
inLochner, the doctrinal debate could have been framed in terms of core
values (central to the concept of ordered liberty) protecting the individ-
ual, while grafiting the need to regulate some behaviors in the interest of
public welfare. The balancing could have been between the core right
to a livelihood and the freedom to make personal economic decisions, on
the one hand, and the public good to be derived from protecting workers
from exploitive working conditions and uneven bargaining power, on the
other. The Justices could have avoided the "incorporation" struggle and
the search for a penumbra to protect the "right to privacy." Would such
an outcome have avoided the artificial construct of the private/public
debate, the state action requirement as a way of allowing private
discrimination to flourish, or the hierarchy of rights or double standards
in terms of the Court's deference to, or scrutiny of, state regulation of
non-economic and economic rights? Would the Court have avoided the
spurious levels of scrutiny, which in recent decisions show some signs
of collapsing into possibly a more meaningful level of review without
the qualifiers (which of course, become disqualifiers for certain folks)?
Here we must face the limits of "counterfactual doctrine" as a predictor
of actual outcomes had this one event turned out differently. Rather
"virtual doctrinal development" allows us to envision what could have
been...
Today, we face a new century in many ways captive of the past
century, with its failure to achieve Abraham Lincoln's vision of "a
rebirth of freedom." We also are experiencing a doctrinal implosion in
constitutional rights theory and a serious erosion of confidence in all
three branches of government Perhaps in the next millennium, the time
56. Melissa L Saunders Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindess. 96
MICHLL REV. 245,247-48 (1997).
57. In her only rcference to the Slaughter-House Cases, Robin West agrees that the Suprem
Court "confused and aborted" the concept of natural or affirmative rights intended by its framers
in her. Nevertheless, even as she argues pesuasively and passionately for a reorientation of our
understanding of the 14th Amendment, she ignores the significance of the "prvileg- or
immunities" clause as a possible %chicle for such revision. See ROBIN WEsr. TOWARD AN
ABOITIONIST INTERPRErATION. PROGRESVE CONSTONAui RECONSTRUCIING TH
FOUETEENH AMINMENT 34 (1994).
58. 1 think the new Democratic Republic of South Africa got it right. Primn fdeevidence
of discrimination should shift the burden of proof. No Washington v. Davis proof of intent, no
multi-tiered levels of scrutiny, and no suspect classifications within which a plaintiff must fit for
the Court to take seriously the allegation of discrimination. Justice Sachs and others studied our
Constitution and our jurisprudence thoroughly. They made sure they avoided the quagmire in
which we now find our own tights doctrine.
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will be right to recommit to the full implications of our "Never Again"
principles-principles which have ignited international movements for
human rights, even while a comprehensive human rights policy under
our own constitutional regime remains elusive.
